Drotrecogin alfa (activated) ... a sad final fizzle to a roller-coaster party by Angus, DC
With the announcement on 26 October 2011 that Eli Lilly 
and Company (Indianapolis, IN, USA) was withdrawing 
drotrecogin alfa (activated) from the worldwide market, 
we witnessed the end of the only drug speciﬁ cally 
approved for sepsis. Th e move was prompted by the 
failure of PROWESS-SHOCK, a large international study, 
to conﬁ rm the beneﬁ t reported from the original trial, 
PROWESS (Protein C Worldwide Evaluation in Severe 
Sepsis), 10  years ago. In the aftermath, many questions 
will be raised. Here, I discuss two initial questions. Before 
proceeding, I should declare that I led the long-term 
follow-up and cost-eﬀ ectiveness studies accompanying 
PROWESS and served on the Data Safety and Monitoring 
Board of PROWESS-SHOCK (see Acknowledgments for 
full disclosure).
First, was the initial decision to approve 
drotrecogin wrong?
Drotrecogin was approved largely on the basis of a single 
phase 3 trial, which was stopped early for eﬃ  cacy [1]. 
Most drugs are approved after two positive phase 3 trials, 
but exceptions are made when there are impressive 
supporting data, there is a compelling unmet clinical 
need, or the trial results are particularly impressive. 
Although an external US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) advisory panel was split on whether to approve, 
the FDA nevertheless felt that these conditions were met. 
Many of the world’s large drug regulatory bodies 
concurred with the FDA decision. It seems, therefore, 
that the decision to approve, though based on only one 
phase 3 trial, was consistent with the procedures and 
habits of regulatory bodies around the world.
For all new drugs, approval occurs at a point when 
considerable uncertainty remains. Typically, the drug has 
been administered to only a few thousand patients, in 
highly controlled situations, with limited long-term 
follow-up. Th e rationale for not waiting until more is 
known about a drug is twofold. First, further delay means 
that patients are denied new and eﬀ ective therapies. 
Second, a longer time to generate more evidence raises 
the drug development costs for pharmaceutical 
companies while shortening the post-approval patent life 
(when a company recoups its investment), thus worsen-
ing the risk-reward ratio and potentially choking overall 
investment in drug development.
Because approval occurs while uncertainty persists, a 
variety of post-approval surveillance activities are 
performed in case the decision must be reversed. In the 
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key if we are to most wisely test agents designed to 
manipulate the septic host response.
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ﬁ ve years leading up to drotrecogin’s approval in 2001, 
the FDA approved 597 new therapies. Of these, 1.7% have 
subsequently been withdrawn [2-4]. In other words, there 
is a low, but non-zero, rate of drug withdrawal. A lower 
rate would be preferable, but without major changes to 
patent laws or to the science and costs of drug 
development, the chilling eﬀ ect of a more stringent 
approval process on dwindling drug pipelines would 
likely be considered intolerable.
So, while we might lament that a sepsis drug was one of 
the unlucky ones, the fundamental drug approval process 
that led to drotrecogin approval does not seem too 
lenient, wrong, or unreasonable. Th at said, it is a shame 
that PROWESS was stopped early, something outside the 
control of the FDA, as early stopping biases toward an 
overestimate of treatment eﬀ ect [5]. And it is a shame 
that the costs and logistics of running two concurrent 
phase 3 trials in critical care seem to be insurmountable 
obstacles in the drug development process. Cheaper and 
easier trials could allow us to generate greater certainty 
without compromising drug pipeline.
Second, was the decision to withdraw drotrecogin 
too hasty?
Th e usual reason for withdrawal is determination of a 
previously unknown yet highly undesired side eﬀ ect. 
Post-approval surveillance of drotrecogin included some 
large observational studies. Th ese studies generally reported 
mortality beneﬁ ts similar to that seen in PROWESS [6-
12]. Th e studies also provided greater information about 
bleeding risks, which led to further label restrictions [13]. 
However, somewhat unusually, the withdrawal in this 
instance was a voluntary decision based not on safety but 
on failure to conﬁ rm eﬃ  cacy.
Drotrecogin is a biologically active agent. Numerous 
human and animal studies suggest that it modulates 
coagu lation and inﬂ ammatory pathways and interacts 
with endothelial function in the midst of intense innate 
immune responses to challenges such as sepsis. It is 
certainly conceivable that such eﬀ ects could hurt or help 
patients with sepsis. A previous simulation exercise of 
theoretical anti-tumor necrosis factor (anti-TNF) anti-
body trials in sepsis demonstrated that modest diﬀ er-
ences in the distribution of unmeasured variables such as 
host genotype and pathogen characteristics could lead to 
trials in which the same drug produces opposing results, 
even when patients meet the same clinical criteria [14]. It 
seems plausible that the same could be true with 
drotrecogin.
PROWESS-SHOCK attempted to enroll patients 
ideally suited for drotrecogin. In the original PROWESS 
study, the largest reduction in absolute mortality was 
noted in patients who appeared to be sicker (for example, 
those presenting with septic shock). A subsequent trial 
– Administration of Drotrecogin Alfa (Activated) in Early 
Stage Severe Sepsis, or ADDRESS – targeted patients 
with lower severity of illness and could not demonstrate 
eﬃ  cacy [15]. Th us, we now have an original trial suggest-
ing beneﬁ t in both low and high severity risk, with a 
constant relative risk reduction but variable absolute 
reduction, and two subsequent trials mimicking the low 
and high ends of the original trial but failed to repeat the 
positive ﬁ ndings. Provided that all trials were conducted 
well, the results of PROWESS-SHOCK and ADDRESS 
raise doubt about the PROWESS results, but, equally, the 
PROWESS results raise doubt about those of PROWESS-
SHOCK and ADDRESS.
When data from multiple trials are synthesized, such as 
in a meta-analysis, a negative study does not trump a 
positive study of similar quality. Rather, the results from 
both trials are combined to give an overall estimate of 
treatment eﬀ ect. Given the potential for diﬀ erences in 
important but unmeasured variables at baseline in sepsis 
to change the result, such an approach seems wise. We 
have not yet seen such a meta-analysis. However, it seems 
possible that the result will be a point estimate in favor of 
drotrecogin over placebo but of a magnitude far smaller 
than in the original trial and probably no longer 
statistically signiﬁ cant.
If that is the case, things get tricky. If the combined 
estimate from the literature is, say, a non-signiﬁ cant 2% 
to 3% reduction in mortality, would we be interested in 
conﬁ rming whether such an eﬀ ect was signiﬁ cant? Th at 
would normally depend on the cost of one more (much 
larger) conﬁ rmatory trial, our desire to tolerate non-fatal 
bleeding side eﬀ ects, and the resulting ﬁ nancial impact 
(both per-patient cost-eﬀ ectiveness and global increase 
in spending) of adopting the drug should the beneﬁ t be 
conﬁ rmed.
Such quandaries could be formally estimated in a 
value-of-information analysis – how valuable is it to 
know the answer with greater certainty? However, the 
decision was taken out of our hands. Eli Lilly and 
Company no doubt considered the potentially very large 
cost of another trial, the fact that regulatory agencies and 
the ﬁ eld of critical care might be so skeptical as to 
threaten the ability to conduct another trial or adopt its 
results into practice or both, and the likelihood that the 
trial would be negative. Taking these factors together, the 
company presumably decided that to go forward was just 
too risky. Whether the action of Eli Lilly and Company 
has left a drug that could cut sepsis mortality by 2% to 3% 
‘on the table’ is something we will now likely never know.
Next steps
We will all see the details of PROWESS-SHOCK 
published in the coming weeks or months. No doubt, a 
formal meta-analysis will follow. Residual issues to 
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consider will likely be as follows. First, should this story 
reinvigorate our drive to complement clinical enrollment 
criteria with biomarkers that better select patients likely 
to beneﬁ t from a given immunomodulating agent?
Second, should we ask of ourselves what we as a 
community might have done diﬀ erently? Certainly, 
greater engagement in clinical trials would seem to be an 
obvious ﬁ rst step – a huge part of the costs of clinical 
trials is that they take a long time and enroll only a tiny 
fraction of all patients with severe sepsis. Our ability to 
make wiser choices about drugs would be enhanced if we 
could conduct larger trials more rapidly. Much time, 
energy, and emotion were devoted to forming opinions 
about PROWESS and about drotrecogin, often with 
strongly voiced opinions about both the drug and Eli Lilly 
and Company. One can hope that decisions about future 
drugs will be made in environments richer in data and 
poorer in opinion.
Finally, intensivists do not develop drugs. If we believe 
that there is a role for pharmacomanipulation of critical 
illness, our partnership with the pharmaceutical industry 
is a prerequisite. Th us, we must think about whether the 
partnership works properly in terms of open, eﬃ  cient, 
rapid, and rigorous science for the optimal beneﬁ t of all 
concerned, especially our patients.
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